Historical futures by Simon, Z.B. & Tamm, M.
History and Theory 60, no. 1 (March 2021), 3-22              © 2021 The Authors. History and Theory published by 
Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Wesleyan University.
DOI: 10.1111/hith.12190
IteratIons:  
an open-ended serIes of artIcles to Be puBlIshed  
In sequentIal Issues of the Journal
 
HISTORICAL FUTURES
ZOLTÁN BOLDIZSÁR SIMON AND MAREK TAMM1
ABSTRACT
This article outlines the agenda of a collective research project that aims to explore 
modalities of historical futures that constitute our current historical condition. To present 
the collective work adequately, we have teamed up with History and Theory and initiated a 
long-term serial publishing experiment. In the coming years, each issue of the journal will 
feature contributions to this research endeavor. In our project-opening piece, we briefly 
introduce the experiment and the premises of the collective research agenda. We begin 
by recounting the many ways in which increasingly towering novel future prospects have 
begun to capture the scholarly world’s attention across disciplinary boundaries. We then 
introduce the notion of historical futures. Crediting theoretical inspirations and paying 
intellectual debts to conceptual relatives, we define “historical futures” as the plurality of 
transitional relations between apprehensions of the past and anticipated futures. At the core 
of the article, we formulate our call for a collective investigation of modalities of historical 
futures and sketch three basic sets of concerns that the explorative works in this experiment 
may address: kinds of transitions from past to futures, kinds of anticipatory practices, and 
kinds of registers as interpretive tools that position such practices on a variety of spectrums 
between two poles (for instance, a value register with the poles of catastrophic and redemp-
tive futures). Finally, we close with a brief note about the necessity of collective endeavors. 
 
Keywords: historical futures, modalities of the future, transition, anticipatory practices, 
Anthropocene, technology, technoscience, time, temporality
THE EXPERIMENT
Today’s challenges increasingly lie with the future. The shadow cast over our 
present by the times to come has grown so immense in its scale and scope that 
we struggle to comprehend the predicament in which we find ourselves. To make 
things even more difficult, the cognitive challenge of grasping our situation is 
accompanied by a sense of urgency. Whether our prospects concern existential 
catastrophes or future dreamlands—be they related to technoscientific revolu-
tions, anthropogenic changes in the Earth system, or sociopolitical transforma-
tions—the futures weighing on us seem to demand immediate action. Whereas 
Western modernity was assumed to be behind the wheel, steering the globe 
toward its desired futures (which were typically presented as desired futures for 
all), today’s technoscientific, anthropocenic, and sociopolitical prospects seem to 
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escape human control in several ways. This is not to say that there is no ambition 
to scale up the project of modernity and continue engineering nature, society, 
and even the human being. From climate engineering to human enhancement, the 
ambition is there, and so too are critiques of it. This is only to say that despite the 
survival of engineering ambitions, there is something that has changed immense-
ly since the heyday of Western modernity, and that something is the future.
New futures—futures that the modern mind could not possibly have imag-
ined—have emerged in the Anthropocene, in scientific and technological 
advancements, and in social and cultural practices. The new futures may not 
replace the old ones, but they may coexist with them in complex constellations 
that have yet to be explored. Most importantly, the new futures emerge together 
with their equally new ways of transitioning from past to future and new modes 
of configuring the relationship between past and future.
Against the backdrop of the emergence of such futures, we hope to design a 
collective research project under the umbrella term “historical futures.” In using 
the term in its plural form, we intend to cover the many ways in which anticipated 
futures relate to apprehensions of the past, and we call for a broad exploration 
of these “modalities of historical futures.” As we find such historical futures in 
our societal and cultural practices as well as in professionalized historiography, 
exploring them means exploring both their societal and historiographical occur-
rences. The explorative work concerns historical futures both in our present times 
and in the past, with a fully disclosed focus on the former. However, given that 
new historical futures constantly emerge together with the rise of new sociocul-
tural practices that imply apprehensions of the past and visions of the future, and 
given that historical futures change over time as new ways of relating apprehen-
sions of the past and anticipated futures appear and disappear within certain 
societal or cultural practices, we also hope to gain a broader understanding of the 
history of historical futures. 
The exploration of modalities of historical futures—with their various kinds of 
transitions linked and cross-linked with multifarious anticipatory practices that 
work in several registers, and with all further possibilities we cannot foresee but 
hope to stimulate by developing this project—demands an endeavor that is both 
collaborative and experimental. Not one discipline and not one scholar has the 
expertise and vision needed to map the complex interrelations and interactions 
of historical futures that animate, structure, and guide a variety of anthropocenic, 
naturalcultural, sociopolitical, technoscientific, and environmental practices. 
At the same time, the conventional modes of collective work through research 
projects are constrained by and necessarily tailored to whatever can secure fund-
ing, and they do not usually allow for the freedom of research methodology or 
presentation of results that we hope to offer here. 
To stand even the slightest chance of living up to the potential that we think 
historical futures has as a concept and as a research program, we have joined 
forces with History and Theory to design and conduct an experiment. Instead of 
compiling a standard theme issue or edited volume, we have developed a long-
term, continuous, serial, and relatively open-ended publication format. We plan 
to feature contributions to the historical futures project in each issue History and 
Theory publishes in 2021 and 2022, though there is the possibility that the project 
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will extend beyond those dates. The continuous exposure of research over a longer 
run makes visible and embraces the mixture of contingencies and plans, expecta-
tions and surprises, and constraints and liberties that characterize the formation of 
all forms of knowledge (as we know them). Although the experiment is unique in 
that it enables a glimpse—even if only a partial one—into research and knowledge 
production in-the-making, it must also be noted that there is an extent to which 
the project’s direction is less visible, and there is a dimension of the endeavor that 
we will need to determine at a later date: its conclusion. We will close the project 
when we, together with History and Theory, think it has run its course, at which 
time we hope to reflect on its achievements.
The experimental character and the open-endedness of the publication format 
might be matched by an equally experimental attitude and openness toward the 
contributions and forms of collaboration that comprise the historical futures 
project. To kick it off, we invited contributors and collaborators from diverse 
disciplines to join our endeavor of mapping historical futures. Yet as we have 
left the door open for our contributors to introduce further innovations into the 
endeavor, it is likely that the project’s internal dynamics will enable other fellow 
explorers to jump on board. Indeed, this is exactly what we hope for in designing 
an open-ended project.
Perhaps a good way to look at the experiment is to conceive of it as a televi-
sion series format applied to journal articles.2 Due to the serial continuity of 
publication over the long term, there is far more space and time for “character 
development.” Meanwhile, the open-ended nature of the project’s duration and 
its contributions offer the possibility that the “show” will be renewed for more 
“seasons” and that it will introduce new “characters” and “storylines” at any point 
in its “syndication.” As “showrunners,” we will keep track of thematic cohesion 
and oversee the creative process by reaching out to contributors and making the 
“show” run as a whole. Yet the most exciting part is precisely where the series 
analogy breaks down. For in the end, when we decide to conclude the endeavor, 
we hope to revisit our initial expectations and see if we can develop a typology 
or sketch a complex matrix that captures the modalities of historical futures that 
inform our current historical condition. 
To inaugurate the larger endeavor, the coming pages of this project-opening 
piece will outline the collective research project’s rationale in four parts. The 
first part provides a broad justification for the overall endeavor. It recounts the 
many ways in which increasingly towering novel future prospects have begun 
to capture the scholarly world’s attention across disciplinary boundaries. The 
second part introduces the notion of historical futures. In crediting theoreti-
cal inspirations and paying intellectual debts to conceptual relatives, it defines 
“historical futures” as the plurality of transitional relations between apprehen-
sions of the past and anticipated futures. The third part constitutes our call for 
a collective investigation into modalities of historical futures. It sketches three 
basic sets of concerns that the explorative works in this experiment may address: 
kinds of transitions from past to futures, kinds of anticipatory practices, and 
2. Thanks to Sandra Holtgreve for the television series analogy.
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kinds of registers as interpretive tools that position such practices on a variety 
of spectrums between two poles (for instance, a value register with the poles of 
catastrophic and redemptive futures). Finally, the fourth part offers a brief note 
about the necessity of collective work.
THE FUTURE TODAY
Appearing simultaneously bright and cataclysmic, the future has overwhelmed us 
lately. On the one hand, there are the positively stated endeavors: advanced medi-
cal technologies promise to eliminate terminal diseases; transhumanism raises 
the stakes and puts forward a prospect of overcoming our biological limitations 
through biotechnologies; private and public endeavors aim at initiating a new 
space age and pointing onward to multiplanetary futures; ecomodernists propose 
to engineer the Earth system to our benefit and comfort; newly developed and 
developing artificial intelligence promise to enhance our intellectual abilities. On 
the other hand, these very same endeavors are perceived as launching potentially 
catastrophic futures: instead of paving the way to a more equal and just society, 
advanced technologies may be harbingers of societal collapse; a superintelligence 
unfathomable to our cognitive capacities may potentially make its own decisions; 
bioengineering and genome editing could easily be misused and revive the spirit 
of older eugenicist beliefs; the same technologies could also be used to create 
nonhuman beings who outperform us and render us obsolete; and rather than 
engineering the Earth system, our tinkering with natural processes is kicking off 
a human-induced (sixth) extinction of species and may push the planet beyond its 
capacity to support human life.3
Developing an understanding of future prospects can hardly be done without 
addressing the role of history, for it was only with the birth of the modern Western 
idea of history in the eighteenth century that the future began to appear different 
from the past and the present.4 It is little wonder that historical thinking can be 
3. Without even attempting to provide a bibliographic overview of the above prospects, on 
the promises and perils of technology-oriented and anthropocenic futures, see, for instance, N. 
Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman 
Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 
2002); Nicholas Agar, Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2010); Steve Fuller, Humanity 2.0: What It Means to Be Human Past, Present and 
Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, 
Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Perfecting Human Futures: Transhuman 
Visions and Technological Imaginations, ed. J. Benjamin Hurlbut and Hava Tirosh-Samuelson 
(Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016); Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, Le mythe de la Singularité: Faut-il crain-
dre l’intelligence artificielle? (Paris: Seuil, 2017); Catherine Bliss, Social by Nature: The Promise 
and Peril of Sociogenomics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018); Rosi Braidotti, Posthuman 
Knowledge (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2019); The Anthropocene as a Geological Time Unit: A Guide 
to the Scientific Evidence and Current Debate, ed. Jan Zalasiewicz, Colin N. Waters, Mark Williams, 
and Colin P. Summerhayes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Eva Horn and 
Hannes Bergthaller, The Anthropocene: Key Issues for the Humanities (London: Routledge, 2020); 
Konrad Szocik et al., “Visions of a Martian Future,” Futures 117 (March 2020).
4. Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, transl. Keith Tribe 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Lucian Hölscher, Die Entdeckung der Zukunft 
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999); Zachary Sayre Schiffman, The Birth of the Past (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2011).
HISTORICAL FUTURES 7
plausibly presented as fundamental to efforts to imagine the future.5 History con-
nects past and future in various ways, making apparent a basic dialectical relation 
between the two categories. In modern historical understanding, the future is typi-
cally fashioned by the conditions and constraints of the past, though the past is 
also continuously shaped by the future. Alberto Melucci explains: “Whenever we 
confront the possible—as in planning for the future—when we make a decision 
that anticipates the action to come, the past is re-examined, amended, and given a 
new meaning. We thus continually rewrite our own pasts and that of the world.”6 
Put differently, our concept of the past derives from our ideas about the future; 
without a concept of the future, history as we know it is not possible—and the 
same is true of any new forms of history inasmuch as they necessitate the possibil-
ity of change over time in the future.7 Moreover, inasmuch as we think that change 
has taken place between any given pasts and any given futures, we think of those 
futures as being “historical.” 
Our main contention in this project-opening piece is that, today, the future 
looks different than the past to an extent that was simply unimaginable in the 
modern period. New futures have emerged and have been emerging since the 
mid-twentieth century. These new futures are historical in ways other than sce-
narios of continuity—progress, development, or, for that matter, decline—that 
we have been accustomed to in the last two centuries or so. Instead of conveying 
a sense of how past and future are connected, new futures increasingly appear 
to us as disconnective—that is, as no longer connected to the past. Needless to 
say, this does not mean that such futures bear no relation to the past or that they 
cannot be compared to past states of affairs, conditions, and lifeworlds. It means 
only that we need to understand the specificity of these new disconnective futures 
within a complex web of historical futures, old and new.
But what exactly do we mean by “disconnective futures”? It has already become 
rather common to note that the Anthropocene—understood both as a broader 
cultural predicament of our times and as a proposed geological epoch when 
anthropogenic transformations alter the Earth viewed as one system of interacting 
human and physical subsystems—has uprooted our previously held beliefs and 
knowledge: “its advent as a scientific object has already altered how we con-
ceptualize, imagine, and inhabit time.”8 With respect to potential Anthropocene 
futures, the way such anthropogenic planetary transformations happen is that an 
abrupt change pushes the Earth system to an entirely new condition that may no 
longer sustain human life, as best exemplified by research on how the transgres-
sion of “planetary boundaries” threatens to drive the Earth system out of what 
5. David J. Staley, History and Future: Using Historical Thinking to Imagine the Future (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 
6. Alberto Melucci, The Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12.
7. See also Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, “History Begins in the Future: On Historical Sensibility in 
the Age of Technology,” in The Ethos of History: Time and Responsibility, ed. Stefan Helgesson and 
Jayne Svenungsson (New York: Berghahn, 2018), 192-209.
8. Gregg Mitman, Marco Armiero, and Robert S. Emmett, preface to Future Remains: A Cabinet 
of Curiosities for the Anthropocene, ed. Gregg Mitman, Marco Armiero, and Robert S. Emmett 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), ix.
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we as humans may consider our safe operating space.9 Similarly, technoscientific 
futures have already been considered in a fashion of absolute alterity comparable 
to runaway Anthropocene futures. Take, for instance, the prospect of nanotechnol-
ogy as it appeared more than a decade ago: if it “enables us to program matter as 
we would program software, then the world itself can be transformed, our lived 
realities made completely malleable, guaranteeing that the future will be radically 
and immeasurably different from the present.”10
All in all, both Anthropocene and technoscientific futures gesture toward pros-
pects that entail a disconnection of past and future to the extent that “the future 
ceases to be made of the same matter as the past.”11 To briefly hint at the nature 
of this transformation, consider the possiblity that even the future “we” may 
not be made of the same matter as the past “we.” Humans are already increas-
ingly being considered what Samantha Frost has called “biocultural creatures,” 
embedded in a world-ontology of entangled “naturalcultural practices,” to borrow 
Karen Barad’s term.12 At the same time, the cognitive and physical overcoming 
of human biological limitations, as postulated by transhuman scenarios of tech-
nologically enhanced beings, are accompanied by futures populated with alterna-
tive lifeforms ranging from machine superintelligence to a society of ems (brain 
emulations).13 None of these futures can be understood within the framework of 
modern historical thinking, which considered human societal betterment as its 
ultimate horizon. Todays’s futures are—technologically speaking, ecologically 
speaking, or both—more-than-human instead of human and planetary instead of 
global.14
Such previously unimaginable futures do not simply overtake and replace 
older historical futures of utopian societal design, visions of human progress, and 
projects of human emancipation. We believe that the emergence of new kinds of 
disconnective historical futures in the last half-century is not only a phenomenon 
that we must understand in its specificity but also one that, first, reactivates and 
interacts with older kinds of historical futures in profoundly complex ways that 
we struggle to understand and, second, calls into existence vigorous reflections 
on the future from all over the scholarly landscape.
The reactivation and flourishing of older kinds of historical futures due to the 
emergence of newer disconnective ones means that a multitude of coexisting 
9. Johan Rockström et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for 
Humanity,” Ecology and Society 14, no. 2 (2009), 1-33; Will Steffen et al., “Planetary Boundaries: 
Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet,” Science 347, no. 6223 (2015); Will Steffen 
et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene,” PNAS 115, no. 33 (2018), 8252-
59; Steven J. Lade et al., “Human Impacts on Planetary Boundaries Amplified by Earth System 
Interactions,” Nature Sustainability 3 (2020), 119-28.
10. Colin Milburn, Nanovision: Engineering the Future (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2008), 6.
11. Déborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, The Ends of the World (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2016), 26.
12. Samantha Frost, Biocultural Creatures: Toward a New Theory of the Human (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2016); Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and 
the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 32.
13. On ems, see Robin Hanson, The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life when Robots Rule the Earth 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). See also Arthur Kroker, Exits to the Posthuman Future 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014).
14. For more on this, see Marek Tamm and Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, “Historical Thinking and the 
Human: Introduction,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 14, no. 3 (2020), 285-309.
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historical futures pervades and structures our contemporary lives. In that respect, 
we rely and expand on Helge Jordheim’s framework of multiple temporalities, 
which suggests that—behind its unifying and synchronizing impulse—even 
modern historical time harbors multiple temporal regimes.15 Similarly, and 
with respect to what lies ahead, it seems reasonable to hold that a plurality of 
coexisting historical futures informs our lives from our everyday practices to the 
aforementioned grand social imaginaries of transitioning to transhuman futures. 
The various interactions of these previously unimaginable futures with the sur-
viving multiple temporalities of modern historical time—that is, the interactions 
between the temporal configuration of different social and natural systems and 
the interaction of these with the also-interacting temporal experiences of differ-
ent domains of human lives and endeavors—are increasingly difficult to grasp.16
It is precisely the complexity arising out of this profusion of new and old 
historical futures (and their interactions) that have sparked scholarly interest in 
the future from across the disciplines. We’d like to mention a few examples of 
how the last decades have set the human and social sciences on a future track. 
Although sociology and social theory have arguably been on this track for a 
while now,17 we have recently witnessed equally ambitious efforts to establish an 
anthropology of the future that focuses on the anticipatory practices and future 
orientations of everyday life.18 We have also seen efforts to link heritage practices 
with visions of the future;19 to present archaeology as a form of futurology;20 to 
15. Helge Jordheim, “Introduction: Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” History 
and Theory 53, no. 4 (2014), 498-518. See also Rethinking Historical Time: New Approaches to 
Presentism, ed. Marek Tamm and Laurent Olivier (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).
16. As a quick example of the complexities arising out of the interaction of new and old historical 
futures, think of the question of multispecies emancipation. Whereas the project of emancipation is 
arguably a modern phenomenon that entails a modern historical future, and whereas the recognition 
of anthropogenic changes in the Earth system that collides the human and the natural worlds (as 
captured by the notion of the Anthropocene) is arguably a novel occurrence that entails a new kind 
of historical future, multispecies emancipation could hardly be clearly aligned with either the old 
or the new. See The Multispecies Salon, ed. Eben Kirksey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2014); Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, The Emancipatory Project of Posthumanism (Abington: 
Routledge, 2018).
17. Barbara Adam and Chris Groves, Future Matters: Action, Knowledge, Ethics (Leiden: Brill, 
2007); Barbara Adam, “History of the Future: Paradoxes and Challenges,” Rethinking History 14, 
no. 3 (2010), 361-78; Elena Esposito, The Future of Futures: The Time of Money in Financing and 
Society (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011).
18. Rebecca Bryant and Daniel M. Knight, The Anthropology of the Future (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019). For more on anthopology and the future, see Samuel Gerald 
Collins, All Tomorrow’s Cultures: Anthropological Engagements with the Future (New York: 
Berghahn, 2008); Anthropologies and Futures: Researching Emerging and Uncertain Worlds, ed. 
Juan Francisco Salazar, Sarah Pink, Andrew Irving, and Johannes Sjöberg (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2017).
19. See Cornelius Holtorf and Anders Högberg, “Contemporary Heritage and the Future,” in 
The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Heritage Research, ed. Emma Waterton and Steve 
Watson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015), 509-23; Rodney Harrison et al., Heritage Futures: 
Comparative Approaches to Natural and Cultural Heritage Practices (London: UCL Press, 2020); 
Deterritorialising the Future: Heritage in, of and after the Anthropocene, ed. Rodney Harrison 
and Colin Sterling (London: Open Humanities Press, 2020); Cultural Heritage and the Future, ed. 
Cornelius Holtorf and Anders Högberg (London: Routledge, 2020).
20. Paul Graves-Brown, Rodney Harrison, and Angela Piccini, introduction to The Oxford 
Handbook of the Archaeology of the Contemporary World, ed. Paul Graves-Brown, Rodney Harrison, 
and Angela Piccini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11. See also Matthew C. Reilly, 
“Futurity, Time, and Archaeology,” Journal of Contemporary Archaeology 6, no. 1 (2019), 1-15.
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understand how geographies are lived and made as futures are imagined and 
hoped for;21 and last but not least, to conduct historical investigations into past 
visions of the future.22
As this brief overview already testifies, the radical alterity of recent techno-
scientific and anthropocenic historical futures (and their coexistence with older 
kinds of historical futures) invites many questions and gives rise to competing 
interpretations. To narrow those questions down to ones that have recently 
occupied historically oriented scholarship, one may ask: does the fact that, in 
trying to avoid catastrophes, we tend to extend our present condition into the 
future mean that we have lost future-orientation and become presentist, as recent 
cultural diagnoses hold?23 Or is our prevalent “horizon of expectation” charac-
terized mostly by new, short-term future prospects?24 Or does the sheer fact of 
being invested in the future mean that we still imagine our futures in relation to 
our pasts? Should we reassure ourselves by retaining the modern idea of history? 
Should we assume that “practical pasts” are still guiding us into the future in a 
developmental manner?25 Should we instead recognize that what the new futures 
challenge is precisely history as we know it?26 Or should we perhaps discover 
how both may be the case at the very same time? Should we affirm the entangle-
ment of the human world with the nonhuman and the natural and engage in new 
kinds of historical writing such as “posthumanist history,” “planetary history,” or 
“more-than-human history”?27
21. Ben Anderson, “Preemption, Precaution, Preparedness: Anticipatory Action and Future 
Geographies,” Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 6, (2010), 777-98.
22. See, for instance, Georges Minois, Histoire de l’avenir: Des prophètes à la prospective (Paris: 
Fayard, 1996); Lawrence L. Samuel, Future: A Recent History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2009); Die Zukunft des 20. Jahrhunderts: Dimensionen einer historischen Zukunftsforschung, ed. 
Lucian Hölscher (Frankfurt: Campus, 2017); Jenny Andersson, The Future of the World: Futurology, 
Futurists, and the Struggle for the Post-Cold War Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018). In a certain although rather narrowly construed way, “historical futures” may also mean such 
historical investigations of how past lifeworlds conceived of and related to the future. As we will 
see, the notion of historical futures we develop here is one of a different order, although historical 
investigations into historical futures as we define it might just as well form a part of the overall 
research agenda.
23. François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time, transl. Saskia 
Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Our Broad Present: 
Time and Contemporary Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). For recent critical 
discussions, see Aleida Assmann, Is Time Out of Joint? On the Rise and Fall of the Modern Time 
Regime, transl. Sarah Clift (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020); Christophe Bouton, 
“Hartog’s Account of Historical Times and the Rise of Presentism,” History 104 (April 2019), 309-
30; Chris Lorenz, “Out of Time? Some Critical Reflections on François Hartog’s Presentism,” in 
Tamm and Olivier, Rethinking Historical Time, 23-42.
24. Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation’: Two Historical 
Categories,” in Futures Past, 255-75. See also Jérôme Baschet, Défaire la tyrannie du présent: 
Temporalités émergentes et futurs inédits (Paris: La Découverte, 2018). For a discussion, see Marek 
Tamm, “How to Reinvent the Future?” History and Theory 59, no. 3 (2020), 448-58.
25. Hayden White, The Practical Past (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014). See 
also Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014).
26. Dipesh Chakrabaty, “Anthropocene Time,” History and Theory 57, no. 1 (2018), 5-32; Zoltán 
Boldizsár Simon, “(The Impossibility of) Acting Upon a Story that We Can Believe,” Rethinking 
History 22, no. 1 (2018), 105-25.
27. Ewa Domanska, “Posthumanist History,” in Debating New Approaches to History, ed. Marek 
Tamm and Peter Burke (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 327-38; Dipesh Chakrabarty, The 
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In order to cope with the aforementioned questions (that have arisen out of 
confrontations with the futures of our own times), we have launched this collec-
tive research project designed to investigate modalities of historical futures. The 
remaining pages will sketch the premises of the endeavor and introduce its key 
notions, starting with the term “historical futures.”
HISTORICAL FUTURES
Conceptually speaking, the notion of historical futures can claim affiliation with 
Reinhart Koselleck’s foundational work on the semantics of historical time, 
especially his theory of interplay between “space of experience” and “horizon of 
expectation,” which defines the very condition of possible histories.28 Koselleck 
argues, like we do in this project, that differentiating and relating pasts and 
futures (or experiences and expectations) underlies the modern invention and 
conceptualization of history. Yet we think that Koselleck’s work is instructive 
only inasmuch as it concerns temporal experiences and historical futures that 
we have inherited from Western modernity in one form or another. Indeed, there 
is also an extent to which the notion of historical futures clearly departs from 
Koselleck’s framework. That extent is the very premise of this whole project, 
for the reason why historical futures demand our attention today is precisely 
because Koselleck’s categories are no longer instructive for newly emerging 
futures, which, we believe, entail a disconnection between past experiences and 
imaginaries of unfathomable futures (not to mention the implied task of mapping 
the complex interactions between old and new).29
In a similarly ambivalent manner, we can see a conceptual affinity between 
historical futures and Niklas Luhmann’s pioneering work on social temporality, 
which has its starting point in the idea that social orders are inherently temporal 
orders.30 According to Luhmann, the forms by which notions of the future are 
integrated into different social orders constitute an essential way of distinguish-
ing their operations from one another. In this context, he makes an important 
conceptual distinction between “present futures” and “future presents.” The first 
term refers to present observations of potential futures—to competing future 
visions across various discourses—and the second term denotes the practical 
relations that bind one operation or outcome to another as part of a sequence of 
actions in time.31 Luhmann thinks that “the prevailing conception of the present 
Crises of Civilization: Exploring Global and Planetary Histories (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2019); Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Planet: An Emergent Humanist Category,” Critical Inquiry 
46 (Autumn 2019), 1-31; Marek Tamm and Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, “More-Than-Human History: 
Philosophy of History at the Time of the Anthropocene,” in Philosophy of History: Twenty-First-
Century Perspectives, ed. Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 198-215.
28. Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation’: Two Historical Categories.”
29. For more on how Koselleck’s categories are defied by disconnection, see Zoltán Boldizsár 
Simon, History in Times of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for the 21st Century (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), ix-xi, 56-57, 62.
30. Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, transl. John Bednarz Jr. with Dirk Baecker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), 41-52.
31. Niklas Luhmann, “The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society,” Social 
Research 43 (Spring 1976), 130-52.
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future seems to be a utopian one, with an optimistic or a pessimistic overtone,”32 
whereas the future present is shaped primarily by technological developments.33 
Again, although we see value in the distinction Luhmann traces, the specific 
content subsumed within his categories seems to reflect Western modernity’s 
futures. As in our response to Koselleck, we are primarily interested in mapping 
new historical futures that may even end up modifying Luhmann’s categories.
Moving closer to current debates, historical futures can be related to François 
Hartog’s notion of “regimes of historicity,” which captures how, in different con-
figurations of past, present, and future, one of the three dominates the other two.34 
This provides the basis for Hartog’s claim that a future-oriented modern regime 
of historicity overtook a previous past-oriented one while, since the 1980s, the 
future-oriented regime has been overtaken by a presentist one. What we think res-
onates closely with our agenda is less the notion of presentism and more Hartog’s 
categorial innovation. The notion of historical futures is just as much an analyti-
cal category as is Hartog’s concept of “regimes of historicity.” They both have 
to do with temporality, and they both entail a historical dimension that enables 
us to track change over time in the temporalities we investigate. But the notion 
of historical futures departs from Hartog’s “regimes of historicity” in two ways. 
First, historical futures, unlike “regimes of historicity,” is interested in explor-
ing a plurality of historical futures not only diachronically but also synchronical-
ly. What the so-called synchronic plurality assumes is precisely the nonsynchro-
nous coexistence of historical futures—that is, the coexistence of many ways to 
configure the relation between apprehensions of the past and anticipated futures. 
In that sense, as we mentioned earlier, our project is also affiliated with the recent 
interest in exploring multiple times and pluritemporalities.35 What’s more, focus-
ing on the plurality of historical futures broadens existing definitions of “histori-
cal culture.” As Maria Grever and Robbert-Jan Adriaansen have recently argued, 
the “umbrella concept” of “historical culture” refers, at its broadest, to “people’s 
relationships to the past.”36 We wonder how “historical” that “culture” can be 
32. Ibid., 142.
33. Departing from Luhmann, Lucian Hölscher has recently developed a useful conceptual distinc-
tion between “future pasts” and “past futures.” See Lucien Hölscher, “Future Pasts: About a Form of 
Thought in Modern Society,” Sustainability Science 14, no. 4 (2019), 899-904.
34. Hartog, Regimes of Historicity. See also François Hartog and Gérard Lenclud, “Régimes 
d’historicité,” in L’État des lieux en sciences sociales, ed. Alexandru Dutu and Norbert Dodille (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1993), 18-38; François Hartog, “Historicité/régimes d’historicité,” in Historiographies, 
ed. Christian Delacroix, François Dosse, Patrick Garcia, and Nicolas Offenstadt (Paris: Gallimard, 
2010), 2:766-71. See also María Inés Mudrovcic’s forthcoming digital resource, “Regimes of 
Historicity,” Bloomsbury History: Theory and Method (2021). 
35. Jordheim, “Introduction: Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization”; Allegra F. P. 
Fryxell, “Time and the Modern: Current Trends in the History of Modern Temporalities,” Past and 
Present 243, no. 1 (2019), 285-98.
36. Maria Grever and Robbert-Jan Adriaansen, “Historical Culture: A Concept Revisited,” in 
Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education, ed. Mario Carretero, Stefan 
Berger, and Maria Grever (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 73. For another definition of “histori-
cal culture,” see Peter Lambert and Björn Weiler, “Introduction: What is Historical Culture: Themes 
in Historical Culture,” in How the Past Was Used: Historical Cultures, c. 750–2000, ed. Peter 
Lambert and Björn Weiler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): “Historical culture encompasses 
the totality of means and media by which societies, groups and individuals engaged with the past and 
expressed their understanding of it” (1).
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without the equal inclusion of people’s relationships to the future, especially 
given that any sense of historicity, as Hartog has also implied, is just as much a 
matter of relating to the future as it is a matter of relating to the past. The same 
remark applies to recent proposals to focus in historical theory on how people in 
the here-and-now relate to what they perceive as their past.37 It also applies, on a 
more general level, to the broader shift in the philosophy of history, as diagnosed 
by Frank Ankersmit: 
philosophy of history moved in the last decade from the narrativist preoccupation with 
the question of how we write about the past to the “existentialist” issue of how we relate 
to it. The shift meant a transition from a primarily philosophical approach to one inspired 
by an indefinite set of non-philosophical perspectives on how human beings interact with 
their past.38 
Again, we wonder how all this would be possible and how all this could be con-
sidered “historical” without addressing the likely most salient and “historical” 
question of the future today.
This leads to the second point that, despite the close relation, indicates a crucial 
difference between “regimes of historicity” and historical futures. Whereas the 
former notion intends to capture the inner relation of past, present, and future, 
the latter is interested in the many actual ways and modes in which, in any given 
present and in any given spatial environment and social practice, apprehensions 
of the past and anticipated futures are put in transitional relations to each other. 
The central concern of historical futures is not which dimension of time (past, 
present, or future) dominates the other two, as is the case for Hartog’s “regimes of 
historicity,” which are differentiated by virtue of grounding the point of view in 
the past (medieval regime), the future (modern regime), or the present (presentist 
regime). Instead, the notion of historical futures traces how change is expected 
to occur from past to future, as seen from the present viewpoint in different soci-
etal, human, technoscientific, and naturalcultural practices dispersed in space and 
time. In other words, instead of assuming that our current regime of historicity 
would be presentist, the notion of historical futures intends to capture a multi-
tude of complex interrelations of dimensions of time as they occur in coexisting 
practices.
We reckon that our definition of “historical futures” (as the plurality of transi-
tional relations between apprehensions of the past and anticipated futures) evokes 
associations with historiography as the culturally sanctioned “legitimate” practice 
of historical knowledge production in Western modernity. This is precisely why 
we cannot emphasize enough that professionalized history is only one of the 
potential practices in which historical futures can be traced—hence our use of 
the phrase “apprehension of the past” instead of “knowledge of the past.” Upon 
considering both phrases, we thought it best to make clear that we do not intend to 
convey a sense that we confine the relation to the past to one that is closely linked 
with a particular scholarly mode of apprehending the past as historical knowledge 
37. See Mark Day, “Our Relations with the Past,” Philosophia 36 (April 2008), 417-27, and 
Herman Paul, Key Issues in Historical Theory (New York: Routledge, 2015).
38. Frank Ankersmit, “Forum Debate on Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen’s Postnarrativist Philosophy of 
Historiography: Introduction,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 11, no. 1 (2017), 2.
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(let alone with an even more particular mode that equates historical knowledge 
with historiographical knowledge produced by an institutionalized discipline). 
Instead, what we hope to capture with the phrase are ways of comprehending the 
past as various societal practices either explicitly define or tacitly imply it. The 
implied apprehension of the past in discourses and practices revolving around 
heritage, for instance, may be something that historiographical knowledge would 
not support, yet cognitive apprehensions of the past in heritage practices equally 
imply anticipated futures.39 Such heritage practices produce historical futures 
inasmuch as they postulate certain transitional relations between their implied 
apprehensions of the past and implied futures.
To phrase it more clearly, we link the historicality of historical futures with 
a variety of coexisting social, cultural, environmental, technological, scientific, 
and political practices—from heritage practices to transhuman imaginaries—of 
which professionalized historiography is only one. The historical futures of our 
times, we believe, are of various modalities that form highly complex temporal 
arrangements. Let’s have a closer look at them. 
MODALITIES OF HISTORICAL FUTURES
In medieval Latin, “future” is a plural noun—futura.40 We similarly argue that, 
instead of a single future, we should think about futures in plural—or more 
specifically, about different modalities of the future. This idea, being absent in 
ancient philosophy of modalities, started to take hold in the Latin West from the 
twelfth century and laid the basis for the contemporary possible world semantic 
theories.41 By invoking notions of modality and modalities, we have in mind the 
variety of possible (but not necessary) futures figured simultaneously in differ-
ent societal and cultural practices. In philosophical terms, “modality” refers here 
to the conception of simultaneous alternative states of affairs. Linked with the 
notion of historical futures, it should be understood as a referential multiplicity 
with respect to various synchronic alternatives for the taking place of futures. 
Such possible and simultaneous futures are historical inasmuch as they imply 
certain forms of transition from pasts to futures—that is, inasmuch as they are 
informed by a notion of change in putting (apprehensions of) the past and (antici-
pated) futures into a transitional relation.
We call for a collective investigation of these modalities of historical futures 
in order to develop an understanding of our current historical predicament that 
39. A good example is a recent international research project on “Heritage Futures” that analyzes 
heritage activities as “future-making practices” and is interested in the capacities of different forms 
of heritage practices to generate specific kinds of futures. See the earlier reference on heritage and 
the future in note 19.
40. Jean-Claude Schmitt, “Appropriating the Future,” transl. Peregrine Rand, in Medieval Futures: 
Attitudes to the Future in the Middle Ages, ed. J. A. Burrow and Ian P. Wei (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2000), 5.
41. See Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993); Simo 
Knuuttila, “The Medieval Background of Modern Modal Conceptions,” Theoria 66, no. 2 (2000), 
185-204; Simo Knuuttila, “Medieval Theories of Modality,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, updated 19 April 2017, accessed 10 August 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2017/entries/modality-medieval/. The concept of the “modalities of the future” is used 
also by Baschet, Défaire la tyrannie du présent.
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transcends disciplinary and methodological boundaries. As the ultimate aim is 
to understand the complexities entailed by the coexistence and interactions of 
the multiple historicities of our times in different domains of life, in different 
social and natural systems, and in different naturalcultural and technoscientific 
practices, the primary interest of this experiment is in mapping contemporary 
modalities of historical futures. (To be clear, however, this does not exclude the 
historical study of past modalities of historical futures, which remains a neces-
sary precondition of any comparative project that intends to assess the novelty of 
certain contemporary historical futures.)
Without imposing unnecessary confines on a research agenda defined just 
as much by its upcoming collective investigations as by the premises outlined 
above, we wish to offer some preliminary considerations that may open up vistas 
for exploring the various modalities of historical futures in our age. Although our 
particular take and cultural analysis of the overall situation is inevitably reflected 
both in the broadly construed project premise and in the following discussion, 
our hope is not that the collective endeavor gives a fuller expression of our view 
but that it transcends our particular takes by situating it in a larger conversation.
We thus propose three basic sets of concerns for exploring historical futures. 
The first set covers kinds of transitions from pasts to futures. The second revolves 
around kinds of anticipatory practices that one can trace in cultural, social, politi-
cal, technological, ecological, scientific domains, and so on—practices that imply 
anticipations of the future as relative to apprehensions of the past. Finally, the 
third is about kinds of registers, referring to a variety of spectrums through which 
historical futures can be interpreted (for instance, a value register with dystopian 
and utopian poles). Without aiming to provide an exhaustive overview, we would 
like to indicate a few potential themes, aspects, and perhaps even full-fledged 
modalities to consider with respect to kinds of transitions, anticipatory practices, 
and registers.
Transitions
Development, progress, emancipation, and revolution are among the main forms 
of transition from past to future conditions one can find in modern historical 
understanding. Whereas Koselleck’s conceptual history associates these notions 
with a specifically modern temporalization of concepts and the birth of concepts 
of movement, in our framework they are better interpreted as “transitional con-
cepts” or “concepts of transition.” These modern concepts still inform our con-
temporary anticipatory and future-making practices, but they are typically tied to 
a processual-developmental scenario of change. Even if they undoubtedly gesture 
toward better futures, the same processual-developmental scenarios may inform 
regressive modalities that point to transitions into futures conceived of in nega-
tive terms. In recent decades, however, new forms of transition and new “tran-
sitional concepts” have emerged alongside these more familiar ones, producing 
new modalities of historical futures. In our overview of potential instances, we 
would like to focus mainly on those novel ones.
Let’s begin with exponential change, as it is most frequently invoked in con-
temporary technological discussions. According to many transhumanist thinkers, 
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most technological forecasts dramatically underestimate the power of future tech-
nology because they are based on a linear view of technological progress rather 
than a “historical exponential” view, as Ray Kurzweil calls it.42 The exponential 
view is grounded in the idea that the rate of change or progress accelerates in a 
specific manner, of which the most common example is the increase in comput-
ing power proposed by the famous Moore’s law (an observation-based trend 
projection predicting that the number of transistors in integrated circuits would 
double almost every two years). But for Kurzweil (and likeminded advocates 
of technological futures), “exponential growth is a feature of any evolutionary 
process, of which technology is a primary example.”43
Exponential technological runaways, however, are not infinite. At their end, 
there is the assumed breaking point of reaching greater-than-human intelligence, 
a transformative event associated with the coming technological singularity that 
represents another kind of transition. Inasmuch as the singularity kicks off a 
wholly new reality that is incommensurable to the pre-singularity reality (seen 
from which the post-singularity reality appears unfathomable), it represents 
unprecedented change.44 Similarly, one may argue that some of the transitions of 
the Earth system from its past to its future states may, as projected by Earth sys-
tem science (ESS), qualify as unprecedented change, especially those tied with 
the transgression of climate “tipping points” and “planetary boundaries,” upon 
which complex systems are expected to transition to altered states in a radical 
manner.45 Whereas the ESS vocabulary is typically tied to the notion of abrupt 
change, humanities interpretations of Anthropocene and Anthopocene-related 
futures tend to tie such historical futures to the measure of human experience and 
to the human scale. They typically point at “slow catastrophes” or at a “catas-
trophe without event,” taming and bringing the assumed radicality of transitions 
down to the level of gradual changes in which transitions may occur to the expe-
riencing human subject.46
The same phenomenon can in fact be witnessed in many other contexts. On 
the one hand, on various scales we find the emergence of historical futures of 
42. Ray Kurzweil, “The Law of Accelerating Returns,” Kurzweil: Accelerating Intelligence 
(blog), published 7 March 2001, accessed 10 August 2020, https://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-
accelerating-returns.
43. Ibid.
44. On singularity, see Vernor Vinge, “The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive 
in the Post-Human Era,” Vision 21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of 
Cyberspace, 1 December 1993, NASA Technical Reports Server, accessed 10 August 2020, https://
ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19940022856; David Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 17, no. 9-10 (2010), 7-65; Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific 
and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Amnon H. Eden, James H. Moor, Johnny H. Søraker, and Eric 
Steinhart (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012). On unprecedented change, see Simon, History in Times of 
Unprecedented Change.
45. For more on “tipping points,” see Timothy M. Lenton et al., “Tipping Elements in the Earth’s 
Climate System,” PNAS 105, no. 6 (2008), 1786-93; Marten Scheffer, “Foreseeing Tipping Points,” 
Nature 467 (September 2010), 411-12; Timothy M. Lenton and Hywel T. P. Williams, “On the Origin 
of Planetary-Scale Tipping Points,” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 28, no. 7 (2013), 380-82. For 
“planetary boundaries,” see the references in note 9.
46. Rebecca Jones, Slow Catastrophes: Living with Drought in Australia (Clayton: Monash 
University Publishing, 2017); on “catastophe without event” see Eva Horn, The Future as 
Catastrophe: Imagining Disaster in the Modern Age, transl. Valentine A. Pakis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2018), 55-88.
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radical transitions, from the smallest level of self-branded Silicon Valley fixa-
tions on everyday innovation and disruption, through financial crises measured 
in years, and to the largest scale of biological theories of punctuated equilibrium, 
questioning gradualism in evolutionary theory and the idea of a continuously 
proceeding evolutionary process by arguing that evolutionary change occurs in 
rapid events without much change in the further career of species.47 On the other 
hand, alongside notions of extreme transformations one can find those that aim 
to deliver taming effects and secure smoother transitions to historical futures. The 
likely most self-evident of such taming notions is sustainability, as it is deployed 
in countless different contexts. As Jeremy L. Caradonna emphatically puts it, “we 
might not live in a sustainable age, but we’re living in the age of sustainability.”48 
Is there anything that binds together these newer kinds of transitions (and the 
many others we cannot list here)? How do they relate to and interact with each 
other, and how do they relate to older ones? For one thing, it is striking to see 
that whereas modern “transitional concepts” seem to be tied to the sociopolitical 
domain, the novel ones occur in a large variety of anticipatory practices across 
technoscientific, ecological, and environmental domains. The new kinds of 
“transitional concepts” and the kinds of transitions they capture cannot simply 
be reduced to the interpretive framework of the modern project of delivering the 
best attainable political constitution for human societies, which leads directly to 
the question of the kinds of anticipatory practices that nurture historical futures.
Anticipatory Practices
Historical futures occur in a large variety of anticipatory practices. Some of these 
practices aim explicitly at anticipating the shape of things to come, effectively 
bringing about their desired futures or avoiding undesired ones. Other practices 
merely imply certain historical futures, oftentimes without even conceiving of 
themselves as future-oriented practices, let alone as temporal ones. In our brief 
overview, we necessarily focus on the former ones, though we hope that the 
larger research project will identify and study those less-visible anticipatory 
practices and their implied historical futures too.
In the sociopolitical domain, there has been a long tradition of temporal uto-
pias and dystopias that provide multiple modalities of futures in progressive and 
regressive shapes. In recent decades, we have witnessed a rise of new anticipa-
tory practices in this domain, the most influential probably being ecological or 
green utopias. These ecotopias propose diverse environmental futures, from 
utopias of sustainability to postnatural visions.49 Closely related are extinc-
tion scenarios, particularly those concerning the ongoing and scientifically 
47. For the first outline of the theory, see Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, “Punctuated 
Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,” in Models in Paleobiology, ed. Thomas J. M. 
Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper, 1972), 82-115. For its comprehensive presentation in a 
posthumously published volume, see Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibrium (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2007).
48. Jeremy L. Caradonna, Sustainability: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 176. 
49. Lisa Garforth, Green Utopias: Environmental Hope Before and After Nature (Cambridge, 
UK: Polity, 2018). See also Green Utopianism: Perspectives, Politics and Micro-Practices, ed. Karin 
Bradley and Johan Hedrén (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). For a historical exposé, see Marius de Geus, 
Ecological Utopias: Envisioning the Sustainable Society (Utrecht: International Books, 1999).
ZOLTÁN BOLDIZSÁR SIMON AND MAREK TAMM18
documented human-induced sixth mass extinction of species and the prospects 
of human extinction (either self-authored or due to natural disasters).50 In the 
scholarly world, prospects of extinction opened up new knowledge formations 
that themselves can function as anticipatory practices that produce historical 
futures, including risk research or the birth of a humanities version of extinction 
studies.51 As to further possibilities, considering human extinction as a feasible 
future path has also given new impetus for space exploration, this time with 
goals rather different than in the Cold War Space Race. At the very least, this is 
what Elon Musk meant when he wrote that “history is going to bifurcate along 
two directions. One path is we stay on Earth forever, and then there will be some 
eventual extinction event.”52 The other path, as Musk has proposed, is to become 
a multiplanetary civilization, thereby escaping extinction.
Two of the more traditional laboratories of anticipatory practices are imagi-
native writing (especially science fiction) and the film industry. Although the 
classic literary utopia no longer appeals to most of science fiction writers, we can 
take stock of a great variety of anti-utopias and dystopias, especially in recent 
decades, and thus to the point that some critics have talked about a “dystopian 
turn” in science fiction since the 1980s and 1990s.53 Science fiction is also pro-
ducing the outright apocalyptic visions that affirm the need to think of our present 
time as the time of the end (although, in certain interpretations, this end occurs as 
a way to reopen the future).54 All in all, the future has not been painted in bright 
colors lately—neither concerning technological futures in cinematic and literary 
imagination nor concerning anthropocenic futures in the more recent emergence 
of climate fiction (cli-fi).55
In recent decades, the technoscientific domain has undoubtedly become the most 
receptive to new anticipatory practices, including practices of “visioneering,” to 
use the felicitous term coined by W. Patrick McCray.56 Visioneering is not about 
visioning unreachable utopias; it’s about engineering futures that are just a few 
decades beyond the horizon. One of the guiding ideas in technological visioneering 
50. See, respectively, Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), and John Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human 
Extinction (London: Routledge, 1996).
51. Global Catastrophic Risks, ed. Nick Bostrom and Mailan M. Cirkovic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Extinction Studies: Stories of Time, Death, and Generations, ed. Deborah 
Bird Rose, Thom van Dooren, and Matthew Chrulew (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
52. Elon Musk, “Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species,” New Space 5, no. 2 (2017), 46.
53. Tom Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2000), 147-82.
54. Jean-Paul Engélibert, Fabuler la fin du monde: La puissance critique des fictions d’apocalypse 
(Paris: La Découverte, 2019), 221.
55. Daniel Dinello, Technophobia! Science Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2005); Laura Wright, “Cli-Fi: Environmental Literature for the 
Anthropocene,” in New Approaches to the Twenty-First-Century Anglophone Novel, ed. Sibylle 
Baumbach and Brigit Neumann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 99-116.
56. W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space Colonies, 
Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 13. The full 
passage reads as follows: “visioneering means developing a broad and comprehensive vision for how 
the future might be radically changed by technology, doing research and engineering to advance this 
vision, and promoting one’s ideas to the public and policy makers in the hopes of generating attention 
and perhaps even realization.”
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is enhancement, an idea that is also prevalent in transhumanist discourses; it can 
include genetic, morphological, pharmacological, or cyborg enhancement and can 
concern cognitive, ethical, sensory, or any other physical capacities.57 Needless to 
say, transhuman enhancement practices are severely criticized from various view-
points, and critique may also function as either an explicit or a tacit anticipatory 
practice inasmuch as it necessarily assumes transhuman futures going socially, cul-
turally, ethically, and politically awry.58 The rapid improvements in our knowledge 
of the human genome and the steady expansion in our digital technology capacity 
will, however, likely serve as foundations for new enhancing practices, keeping 
critical anticipatory practices equally busy.
To introduce further instances, a particularly interesting domain of new antici-
patory practices is the financial world. As Elena Esposito has shown, financial 
markets are kind of “temporal markets” because working with credit is using the 
future in the present: “The use of the future is itself sold and bought, and then sold 
again in practices like securitisation. The future is built and bound in more and 
more complex ways, which make more and more wealth available to operators 
and generate the astonishing figures circulating in the ‘virtual’ financial mar-
kets of our society.”59 In the financial world, the future is produced by the very 
operations that try to anticipate it. The financial markets “sell derivatives that set 
the conditions for the future in the present, and look forward to how things will 
continue once the future is accomplished.”60
Far from being confined to the economic sphere, the increasing use of machine 
learning and predictive modeling in financial markets has made algorithmic 
prediction a towering new anticipatory practice in our age. The stunning devel-
opment of algorithmic systems capable of collecting and analyzing current and 
historical facts in order to make predictions about the future has shaped most 
of our daily practices and gave rise to a new “algorithmic culture.”61 One of the 
most striking examples of this is the fight against crime and terrorism, where 
we see algorithms being used to anticipate risks or threats.62 At the same time, 
algorithmic futures going awry and reproducing (or even strengthening) existing 
57. For more on genetic, morphological, pharmacological, or cyborg enhancement, see Stefan 
Lorenz Sorgner, “Pedigrees,” in Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction, ed. Robert Ranisch and 
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014), 30-32. As an introduction to the various forms 
of enhancement, see Human Enhancement, ed. Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
58. See, for instance, N. Katherine Hayles, “Wrestling with Transhumanism,” in H+/-: 
Transhumanism and Its Critics, ed. Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: 
Metanexus, 2011), 215-26; Melinda Hall, The Bioethics of Enhancement: Transhumanism, Disability, 
and Biopolitics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017).
59. Elena Esposito, “Temporal Markets: Money, the Future and Political Action,” Behemoth 9, 
no. 2, (2016), 40.
60. Esposito, The Future of Futures, 4. See also Amin Samman, History in Financial Times 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).
61. Ted Striphas, “Algorithmic Culture,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 18, no. 4-5 (2015), 
395-412; Adrian Mackenzie, “The Production of Prediction: What Does Machine Learning Want?” 
European Journal of Cultural Studies 18, no. 4-5 (2015), 429-45; Paul Dourish, “Algorithms and 
Their Others: Algorithmic Culture in Context,” Big Data & Society 3, no. 2 (2016), 1-11.
62. See Jude McCulloch and Dean Wilson, Pre-crime: Pre-emption, Precaution and the Future 
(London: Routledge, 2015).
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social fissures and inequalities pose as equally serious a threat as the ones the 
algorithms are expected to anticipate and handle.63
As many of the above examples testify, in the last few decades prevision has 
arguably become one of the guiding anticipatory principles behind attempts to 
govern the future in contexts as diverse as crime, biotechnologies, and anthro-
pogenic climate change.64 It is oftentimes accompanied by a “politics of catas-
trophe” that initiates action on the very “unknown” that anticipatory practices 
nevertheless attempt to discern.65 To understand them, we should be able to see 
them in relation to a plethora of other anticipatory practices one could further 
mention in contexts as diverse as Afrofuturism, heritage futures, the futures of 
scenario planning, or the more traditional futures of historiographical knowledge.
Registers
To map the potential range of modalities of historical futures, it would also be 
useful to create a catalog of registers with two poles marking the limits of extrem-
ities, helping to situate future modalities within a space of possibilities. Our aim 
is not to align each historical future with one pole or another but to argue that 
they typically have a position somewhere between the poles. The different regis-
ters that enable us to identify these different positions make up a highly complex 
interpretive matrix, which we hope proves to be valuable for exploring various 
modalities of historical futures. The four main registers we indicate here are far 
from exhaustive, and the list that follows is open for further additions.
First, there is a time register, which entails a spectrum that extends between 
the short-term and long-term poles. For instance, in the economic world we can 
notice a proliferation of immediate futures of financial or economic anticipation. 
We already mentioned the mid-term future visioneering of technoscientific com-
munities, and many of the environmental futures or deep futures fold out or take 
place abruptly in a longue durée of geological time.66 Second, we can distinguish 
a closely related scale register, which is stretched between the poles of small- and 
large-scale futures. Anthropocene futures are typically imagined on a planetary 
scale, but these can be easily translated in specific contexts into local futures and 
related to the scale of concrete human practices.67
63. Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy (New York: Broadway Books, 2016); Virginia Eubanks, Automating 
Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor (New York: St. Martin’s, 
2017); Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism (New 
York: New York University Press, 2018); Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools 
for the New Jim Code (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2019).
64. The Politics and Science of Prevision: Governing and Probing the Future, ed. Andreas 
Wenger, Ursula Jasper, and Myriam Dunn Cavelty (London: Routledge, 2020).
65. Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown 
(London: Routledge, 2011).
66. See, for example, Curt Stager, Deep Future: The Next 100,000 Years of Life on Earth 
(New York: St. Martin’s, 2011); Boris Shoshitaishvili, “Deep Time and Compressed Time in the 
Anthropocene: The New Timescape and the Value of Cosmic Storytelling,” Anthropocene Review 7, 
no. 2 (2020), 125-37.
67. A series of good examples about local, small-scale reactions to planetary Anthropocenic 
challenges is provided by Gaia Vince in Adventures in the Anthropocene: A Journey to the Heart 
of the Planet We Made (London: Chatto & Windus, 2014). As to the planetary imperative, Dipesh 
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Third, we can speak of a value register, which is characterized by the positive 
or negative meaning that we attribute to particular imagined futures. In traditional 
terms, we can differentiate here between a utopian and a dystopian pole, or, with 
different emphases, a redemptive and a catastrophic pole. As mentioned in the 
previous section, in contemporary science fiction and in the rise of new climate 
fiction, the dystopian pole is dominating. The same applies to most discussions 
about the Anthropocene—not only the scientific projections of Earth system 
trajectories but also certain contributions from the human and social sciences.68 
In transhumanist futures, at least in their self-conception, the utopian (or redemp-
tive) pole clearly comes first, just as in the equally technologically focused 
contributions to the Anthropocene that intend to redeem the future of humanity 
through large-scale technological interventions of climate engineering.69
Fourth, a knowledge register would be instrumental in mapping historical 
futures with respect to their “futurization” and “defuturization,” to use a distinc-
tion introduced by Luhmann.70 Futurization is about increasing the openness 
of the future (coping with unpredictability and uncertainties); defuturization is 
about decreasing the openness (valorizing planning, prognosis, prediction, and 
so on). The specific combination of these future-making practices produces 
modalities of the future that oscillate between the poles of uncertain outcome and 
determined outcome. From this perspective, most of the contemporary practices 
of risk assessment, future planning, or algorithmic predictions contribute to the 
defuturization of futures.71
Historical futures can be interpreted in many of these registers at the same 
time. Typically, they can be attributed a position on each of the registers that 
we have mentioned here; they can be said to have an expected duration on the 
time register, a reach that can be seen within the scale register, several evaluative 
aspects to situate with a value register, and a degree of openness in the knowledge 
register. Again, far more registers can be put to work, and within each register 
more poles can be identified in mapping historical futures. Either way, the aim is 
Chakrabarty argues that the planet can be a category in the humanities equivalent to the Earth system 
in Earth system science, while many human and social sciences disciplines attempt lately to scale 
up their expertise to be able to address the planetary. See Chakrabarty, “The Planet: An Emergent 
Humanist Category”; The Planetary Turn: Relationality and Geoaesthetics in the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. Amy J. Elias and Christian Moraru (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2015); 
Nigel Clark and Bronislaw Szerszynski, Planetary Social Thought: The Anthropocene Challenge to 
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2020).
68. See, for instance, Isabelle Stengers, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism 
(London: Open Humanities Press, 2015). For an oppositional view that intends to eschew futurism 
and “stay with the trouble” in order to counterweigh the apocalyptic tone of the discussion, see Donna 
J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2016).
69. On anthropocenic technological redemption, see Clive Hamilton, Earthmasters: The 
Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); John 
Asafu-Adjaye et al., An Ecomodernist Manifesto, April 2015, https://static1.squarespace.
com/static/5515d9f9e4b04d5c3198b7bb/t/552d37bbe4b07a7dd69fcdbb/1429026747046/
An+Ecomodernist+Manifesto.pdf
70. Luhmann, “The Future Cannot Begin,” 141.
71. See also Sven Opitz and Ute Tellmann, “Future Emergencies: Temporal Politics in Law and 
Economy,” Theory, Culture & Society 32, no. 2 (2014), 107-29.
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to capture the complexity of our current historical predicament with the help of 
what we think can be a useful interpretive tool.
A CLOSING NOTE ON COLLECTIVE WORK
The aim of gaining an understanding of our current historical condition and cap-
turing its complexity is one that calls for exceeding the limitations of this open-
ing piece in at least two major respects. First, it is our hope that both the larger 
framework and our more particular take on historical futures will be expanded 
on, challenged, and complicated (and, at the same time, clarified) in the course 
of this collective endeavor. Second, we expect that the collective work we intend 
to facilitate will yield results that we could not possibly have imagined due to the 
confines of our perspectives and cognitive frames. 
Collective work is beneficial in that it has the potential to force us to confront 
our own limitations, thereby pushing us to become attentive to viewpoints, 
aspects, questions, and concerns that we otherwise would not have been able to 
see. This, of course, does not mean that challenges to our most profound beliefs 
are always helpful or beneficial. Aiming at overcoming our most fundamental 
personal and social systems of cohesion on a daily basis would have rather obvi-
ous shortcomings. What we hope to highlight is simply the necessity of collective 
work and its contextual benefit of calling into question our familiar viewpoints, 
particularly under the present circumstances, where a multiplicity of historical 
futures collide with trajectories of the human and the natural worlds that no par-
ticular viewpoint is equipped to address adequately. Although the sciences have 
long been on the collective track, we believe that the human and social sciences 
must open up and develop collective research strategies (also in joint endeavors 
with the sciences) beyond their immediately available ones in order to understand 
a world that increasingly seems to escape our existing categories and modes of 
attributing meaning.  
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